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“These ex-communist countries are advised to move to a market economy … but without 
the appropriate institutions, no market economy of any significance is possible … the 
interrelationships which govern the mix of market and hierarchy … are extremely complex 
... What we need is more empirical work.” 
(Coase, 1991 [2005]) 
 
1. Introduction  
Institutions, specifically property rights and contracting institutions, are regarded 
as conditions that enable markets to function (Smith, 1776; North, 1981). Although 
conceptual or theoretical arguments have been presented, systematic evidence became 
available only recently. Empirical studies show that stronger property rights protection and 
contract enforcement promote firm performance, enhance corporate governance and 
corporate innovation (La Porta et al., 2000; Klapper and Love, 2004), and encourage firm 
growth and reinvestment (Besley 1995; Johnson, McMillan, and Woodruff, 2002; Cull and 
Xu, 2005), thereby promoting economic growth (Acemoglu et al., 2001; Acemoglu and 
Johnson, 2005). Most studies analyze the effect of institutions on the performance 
outcomes or strategies of firms, but little is known on a more basic mechanism about the 
effects of institutions on the effort exertion of entrepreneurs.  
This study attempts to fill this knowledge gap, that is, we analyze entrepreneurial 
responses in their time allocation to institutional constraints, particularly the insecurity of 
private property rights, based on a nationwide random sampling survey conducted in 
China. The dataset we use covers detailed information on the time allocation of 
entrepreneurs and distinguishes among their time devoted to work and leisure and time 
allocated to different activities at work. We analyze the relationships of institutional 
constraints with the time devoted to management and lobbying activities by decomposing 
time allocation of entrepreneurs at work.  
In this paper, “lobby” means activities seeking to influence local governments for 
protecting the businesses of individual entrepreneurs, and it is not about influencing 
legislators or law-making. In China, entrepreneurs are not allowed to organize themselves 
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for political representation independently from the party-state, who makes decisions on 
laws and regulations. Therefore, the lobbying activities of entrepreneurs mainly target the 
arbitrary decisions of local governments, which are not subject to rules or laws, to protect 
their own businesses. 
Time allocation is critically important for entrepreneurs of small- and medium-
sized enterprises (SMEs). Becker (1965) and the follow-up literature focus on the tradeoffs 
that individuals make between work and leisure, that is, working versus non-working time 
allocation.3 However, the process involved in allocating time within the working time of 
entrepreneurs has received significantly less attention. This issue is particularly relevant to 
entrepreneurs of SMEs who normally have less developed management teams and social 
networks. Balancing the efforts exerted on different activities is important for 
entrepreneurs because it could determine the survival and growth of firms. Among the few 
studies on time allocation of entrepreneurs4, the effects of institutions on time allocation of 
entrepreneurs are largely ignored in economics literature. 
Interaction between institutions and time allocation is important as institutions 
influence entrepreneurs’ tradeoffs when they allocate their time and efforts among different 
tasks (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991; Dewatripont, Jewitt, Tirole, 1999 and 2000) 5 , 
particularly among productive and non-productive activities. A major premise of the multi-
task theory is that all efforts of individuals at work are productive. However, this 
presumption could not stand when entrepreneurs face institutional impediments that distort 
the time allocation of talents (Acemoglu, 1995; Acemoglu et al., 2005) and affect their 
efforts in daily work. Entrepreneurs are induced to pursue rent-seeking rather than creating 
                                                          
3Becker (1965) introduces “household production function,” which studies the substitution effect of the growth in 
productivity of working and its tradeoff with consumption time loss. However, Pollak, Robert, and Wachter (1975) argue 
that joint production results in the confounding of tastes and technology within shadow prices. Empirical studies indicate 
that self-employed people report higher job satisfaction than regular employees even when they work longer hours and 
earn lower wages than employees (Benz and Frey, 2004). At the same time, despite their lower pay and rate of promotion, 
women are more satisfied with their jobs than men (Clark, 1997). Social norms and peer pressure may also affect an 
individual’s time allocation to paid work, voluntary work, and leisure (Freeman, 1997; Fehr and Falk, 2002; Akerlof and 
Kranton, 2005). 
4McCarthy, Krueger, and Schoenecker (1990) and Fischer and Reuber (1997) examine the changing time-allocation 
patterns of entrepreneurs as firms move from one stage of development to another. Cooper, Ramachandran, and 
Schoorman (1997) find that craftsmen-entrepreneurs devote less time to administrative activities than entrepreneurs with 
managerial experience. Verheul, Carree, and Thurik (2009) find that female entrepreneurs invest less time in the business 
than male entrepreneurs. 
5 Lucas and Moll (2011) study the effects of multi-tasking on growth. In their model, agents divide their time between 
production and learning activities, which determines real economic growth. 
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new knowledge or products because they have to spend time lobbying to gain government-
controlled sources (Tullock, 1967; Baumol, 1990). However, studies on the interaction 
between institutions and multi-task issues are restricted to theory. To our knowledge, no 
systematic empirical study has investigated the relationships between institutions and the 
time allocation to management and lobbying efforts. 
China provides an interesting case for studying tradeoffs (costs and benefits) faced 
by entrepreneurs when they allocate time to different tasks to address institutional 
impediments. The private sector 6 in China began from scratch in the 1990s because it was 
completely illegal not long ago. Thanks to rapid growth and privatization, the private sector 
now comprises approximately 40 million registered private businesses and 34.07 million 
individually owned businesses. These businesses accounted for more than half of China’s 
GDP by the end of 2010. Private property rights are fully legalized in principle since the 
constitutional amendments in 2004. Allowing and recognizing private property rights are 
important improvements than before, explaining a large part of China’s growth.  
However, not surprisingly, property rights protection remains weak and the 
violation of property rights is a prevalent problem, which is among the major problems that 
China faces. One of the major forms of  property rights violation is the  arbitrary levies 
imposed to private firms by local governments. Most of these arbitrary levies are not formal 
taxes. Instead, they are imposed by local governments arbitrarily, without justifications by 
laws, and in complete absence of citizens’ consent. From time to time, even the Chinese 
central government condemns these levies as “irrational,” “extra-legal,” or even “illegal.”7 
According to a classic principle on property rights and taxation, charging levies without 
citizens’ consent, for example, the approval of the citizens’ representatives, or without legal 
support is a violation of property rights. “[T]he supreme power [i.e. the government] cannot 
take from any man any part of his property [e.g. collecting taxes] without his own consent. 
For the preservation of property being the end of government…” (Locke, 1680 [1823], p. 
                                                          
6A narrowly defined private sector refers to registered private businesses and individually owned businesses. A broadly 
defined private sector refers to all non-state-owned enterprises, including the narrowly defined private businesses, 
collectively-owned enterprises, and foreign enterprises. In this study, we focus on the narrowly defined private sector. 
7 The Chinese economy relies heavily on sub-national governments, including fiscal and financial aspects (Xu, 2011). 
However, the central government takes away most of the tax revenues from local governments, such that local 
governments have to find other sources of revenues. Thus, extra-legal levies have become important revenue sources for 
local governments and have grown fast in the past two decades.  
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165). This principle is not only followed by generations of leading scholars, such as Smith 
(1776), North (1981), and others, but it is also the basis for constitutions of all democracies. 
When this rule is breached and when governments violate property rights, entrepreneurs 
have to exert extra efforts to deal with these institutional obstacles at the cost of their time 
and efforts to management activities. The nature of these problems faced by Chinese 
entrepreneurs is similar to those discussed by Adam Smith when he stated that property 
rights institutions affect entrepreneurship (Smith, 1776).8  
This study investigates the effects of institutional impediments on the allocation of 
time (efforts) of entrepreneurs in modern China. We model entrepreneur’s time–effort 
allocation problem subjected to a property rights-protection constraint. Analytically, this 
model extends Becker’s model (1965) by adding an institutional constraint. In our model, 
the time of an entrepreneur is allocated between leisure and work, which is further allocated 
between management and lobbying time for protecting property rights and dealing with 
related matters. We theoretically show that entrepreneurs devote more time to lobbying 
activities when property rights protection is weaker. Moreover, entrepreneurs’ political 
connections may improve lobbying efficiency, such that the sensitivity of lobbying efforts 
to property rights protection is moderated. 
The above-mentioned theoretical hypotheses are tested empirically. We find that 
property rights institutions significantly affect the time allocation of entrepreneurs at work. 
In particular, entrepreneurs of firms, which are charged with higher levies, that is, suffering 
more severe property rights violation, tend to allot more time to lobbying activities, thus 
costing time used for management activities. Moreover, the sensitivity of lobbying time to 
property rights protection is reduced if the entrepreneur is politically connected or if the 
firm is larger or older. 
To identify the causal relationship between property rights protection and the time 
entrepreneurs devote to lobbying activities, we conduct two-stage estimations with two 
                                                          
8 “Commerce and manufactures can seldom flourish long in any state which does not enjoy a regular administration of 
justice, in which the people do not feel themselves secure in the possession of their property, in which the faith of contracts 
is not supported by law, and in which the authority of the state is not supposed to be regularly employed in enforcing the 
payment of debts from all those who are able to pay.” (Smith, 1981 [1776], p. 910) 
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instrumental variables (IVs) to address potential omitted variable bias and endogeneity 
issues. The first IV refers to the weights of provincial government policies on non-state 
sectors. The second IV refers to the efforts of provincial-level governments in fighting 
corruption. We suggest that both IVs are good predictors for whether the local firms will 
be charged with higher levies or not whereas neither IV should be related to error terms of 
the estimations on the individual time allocation of entrepreneurs. Moreover, we apply the 
over-identification strategy by using two IVs that allow us statistically test the relevance 
and exogeneity of the IVs. The two-stage estimations confirm that our IVs are qualified 
and our empirical findings are robust.  
The rest of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the institutional 
background of private property rights protection and lobbying activities of entrepreneurs 
in China. Section 3 introduces the analytical framework. Section 4 provides information 
on data and variable definitions. Section 5 reports empirical findings. Section 6 concludes 
this study. 
2. Property Rights Institution and Lobbying Activities of Entrepreneurs 
During the pre-reform era in China, private ownership was completely illegal. The 
economic reform launched in 1978 did not have an agenda to allow for private ownership 
as this contradicts the socialist ideology.9 Throughout the reform and development process, 
lingering institutional and ideological biases against private sector remained. The 
development of the private sector and privatization has been gradually tolerated since the 
1990s when the state sector became mired in deep trouble, whereas privately owned firms 
were still not granted de jure rights (Xu, 2011). The de facto private sector took off rapidly 
after 1997 when de facto privatization was permitted officially.10 Since then, the private 
sector has undergone significant development before the constitutional recognition of 
private ownership, which happened in 2004.  
The share of the private sector in the total GDP increased from 2.5% in 1998 to 
nearly 50% in 2009. With its rapid growth rate, the private sector has become the largest 
                                                          
9Private enterprises were not formally permitted to exist until 1988 with the enactment of the Private Enterprise 
Administration Act, which was enacted 10 years after the start of the economic reform. However, even then, the 
constitution did not recognize private property rights. 
10The Partnership Enterprise Law and Sole Proprietorship Enterprise Law were enacted in 1997 and 1999, respectively. 
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engine of economic growth in China. The private sector comprises approximately 40 
million registered private businesses and 34.07 million individually owned businesses. 
Moreover, more than 160 million jobs or 90% of the new jobs in the nation are created by 
the private sector (State Administration for Industry & Commerce, 2011).  
Nonetheless, the institutions under which the private sector operates remain far 
from favorable. The protection of property rights remains poor because of the weak law 
enforcement (Clarke, Murrell, and Whiting, 2008). Anecdotes show that local governments 
may confiscate wealth of private firms within their jurisdictions. Gong Jialong, former 
chairman of the Tianfa Group, which was the largest Chinese private oil company, was 
detained for alleged economic crimes in 2006. After one year and seven months of trial, 
Gong was released and was found not guilty. However, his oil empire was swiftly broken 
up, and most of the businesses were sold to state-owned enterprises (SOEs) at a government 
auction during his absence.11 In other high profile legal cases related to private businesses, 
entrepreneurs were not as fortunate as Gong, that is, they not only lost their assets but also 
were sentenced to long imprisonment or even death, for example, the cases of Lou Hengwei, 
Xu Ronghua, Zhu Menghe, Feng Yongming, and Yang Jinde.12  
One of the most prevailing government expropriations is in the form of various 
non-tax levies, charges, and fines applied to firms. These levies are arbitrary and are not 
based on formal rules and laws. Government revenues consist of three major types: 
budgetary revenue (BR), extra-budgetary revenue (EBR), and non-budgetary revenue 
(NBR) (Wong, 1997; Brown, 1998). Among the three types, EBR and NBR are the main 
sources of local government revenue. In 2006, EBR and NBR amounted to RMB 640.79 
billion (3.02% of total GDP) and comprised 93.2% of the total local government spending 
of that year (China National Statistical Yearbook, 2008). Most EBR and NBR are collected 
in the forms of non-tax levies.  
Local governments have high discretionary power in imposing levies, fees, and 
other burdens as these levies are not regulated by laws or legislators. The self-collection 
and self-utilization policies for EBR and NBR encourage local governments to collect non-
tax levies. Nationwide, approximately 7,600 types of non-tax levies were documented until 
                                                          
11“Former China oil tycoon plots return with Canadian gas venture” (Reuters, 18/03/ 2014)  
12 “Private enterprises are facing the risk of Justice” (The Economic Observer, 02/11/2011) 
8 
 
July 2007, among which only 30 types had precise legal basis, 400 types were justified by 
certain regulations or policies, and 7,100 types were imposed by local governments without 
legal justifications.13 In taking Anhui province as an example, 24,441 government agencies 
of different levels in the province charged 438 items of non-tax levies that accounted for 
RMB 9.52 billion (34.7% of the local revenues) in 2004.14  These non-tax levies and 
charges arbitrarily imposed by various government departments are common ways of 
government expropriation, rent-seeking by corrupt officials, or both, and they lower the 
security of property rights (Lin et al., 2012).  
Zong Qinghou, the chairman of the largest domestic beverage and food producer 
and the second richest man in China according to the Forbes rich list, stressed that his 
Wahaha Group pays more than 400 different government administrative charges each 
year.15 According to the “Nationwide Survey on Enterprise Burdens” conducted by China 
Center for Promotion of SME Development (a government agency under the Ministry of 
Industry and Information Technology), the burden of the levies can be as high as 80% of 
the net profit. Concretely, by average, 4.1% of the total revenue of the enterprises was paid 
as non-tax levies in 2012.16 As a comparison, the average tax was 7.8%, whereas the net 
profit of the firms was 5.1% of the total revenue. 17 Another survey conducted by the 
National Development and Reform Commission of the State Council shows that the illegal 
fees charged by banks accounted 15% of the total costs of corporate bank loans in 2012.18 
Facing high levy burdens at the discretion of the local governments, that is, the 
expropriation of property rights, entrepreneurs have to make substantial efforts to lobby 
local governments to protect their businesses. Mr. Feng Lun, chairman of Vantone Group, 
one of the largest private estate developers in China, reported that two-thirds of the 180 
business trips he made in 2011 were lobbying related.19 In addition to becoming acquainted 
with and bribing government officials, successful entrepreneurs often are more creative 
                                                          
13 See details in “Act on Administrative Fees: Why do we have to wait for so long?” (Democracy and Rule of Law Weekly 
(minzhu yu fazhi zhoukan), 14/11/2007) 
14 See details in http://www.dajunzk.com/zfshoufei.htm 
15 See details in “Wahaha boss urges tax cuts to lift growth” (South China Morning Post, 25 August, 2014)  
16 http://www.miit.gov.cn/n11293472/n11293832/n12843926/n13917012/n15646190.files/n15646096.doc 
17 The average ratio of the levies reported in the survey conducted in 2012 is significantly higher than that reported in the 
survey we used in this study, which was conducted in 2006. This finding is consistent with the anecdotes reported by 
mass media that the burdens from levies have been significantly increased in recent years. 
18 See details in http://finance.people.com.cn/n/2013/0925/c1004-23025543.html 
19 See details in: http://finance.ifeng.com/business/renwu/20130128/7610444.shtml) 
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than others in lobbying, in terms of whom to lobby, what to lobby, and how to lobby. Mr. 
Wang Jianlin, who was ranked as the richest entrepreneur in China in 2013 and 2014, 
asserted in his lecture at the Harvard Business School that “cultivating intimate 
relationships with the government in China is more difficult than conducting a post-doc 
research at Harvard.”20 
Finding ways to protect property rights is an essential task for entrepreneurs. 
Besides direct lobbying efforts, entrepreneurs may also cultivate political connections for 
protections.21 Indeed, more than one-third of the private firms in our sample are owned by 
veteran party members who are well connected to the government even before starting a 
private business. This study attempts to capture how entrepreneurs allocate their time to 
lobbying and management activities depending on the institutional issues they face and the 
political connections they have.  
   
3. Analytical Framework 
Our analytical framework is based on Becker (1965) and inspired by North (1981), 
Acemoglu (1995), and Acemoglu and Johnson (2005). We study the allocation of time or 
efforts of entrepreneurs to maximize utility when property rights are not secure. The time 
of the entrepreneur is allocated between leisure and work, which is further divided between 
management and lobbying time for protecting property rights and dealing with related 
matters. We formally denote the utility function as U(y,ℓ), where y is income, and ℓ is 
leisure. The utility function satisfies the usual conditions, that is, 
(∂/∂y)U=U₁>0;(∂/∂ℓ)U=U₂>0; U₁₁<0;U₂₂<0; and U₁₂=U₂₁>0. Total endowed time T 
will be allocated between working time, h, and leisure time, ℓ. That is, ℓ=T-h. Total 
working time consists of management and lobbying time, that is h = m + ρ. As the largest 
owner of the firm, the income of the entrepreneur, y, consists of profit share of the firm and 
wealth. We denote the ownership share of the entrepreneur as α and wealth as W. We 
assume that the profit of the firm is a function of the entrepreneur’s working hours, that is, 
                                                          
20  See details in: (text: http://money.163.com/12/0919/17/8BPITLLM00253G87_all.html; video: 
http://www.wanda.cn/2013/chairman_0724/28.html) 
21 A stream of literature studies the different effects of entrepreneurs’ political connections on the performance and 
accessibility to bank loans of the firms (Peng and Luo, 2000; Francis et al., 2009; and Fan et al., 2007; Li et al., 2008). 
In particular, Guo et al. (2014) find the 2004 constitutional amendment to be a turning point, where politically connected 
entrepreneurs obtain significantly more bank loans than other entrepreneurs since then. 
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ξm, where ξ is the marginal productivity of m. Thus, the budget constraint of the 
entrepreneur is y=αξm+W. 
To capture the loss of the entrepreneur due to insecure property rights, we assume 
that φ, φ∈ [0, 1], of the disposable income of the entrepreneur from the firm, x(h,ρ), will 
be taken away by the local government. This deduction may include local government 
imposed levies, other burdens, and partial confiscations etc. We suppose that an 
entrepreneur can mitigate the loss by lobbying the local government. A simple way to 
model this situation is (1- ρ) φ of the disposable income from the firm will be taken away 
by the local government, that is, an entrepreneur’s lobbying activity ρ can reduce the loss. 
Thus, the institutional constraint is 
x(h,ρ)=(1- (1-ρ) φ)ξ(h-ρ).                                                                                (1) 
The institutional constraint (1) captures an entrepreneur’s lobbying activities for 
reducing his levies, which is different from lobbying for changing taxation. First, levies, φ, 
is different from taxation because taxation is determined exogenously by the national 
government and lobbying from individual entrepreneurs will not affect it. Second, in our 
model, the local authority has no right to set up or change taxation systems. Ownership 
share α can be interpreted partly as a tax to some extent, which is a fixed rule being setup 
and enforced exogenously such that the entrepreneur is unable to influence the measure. 
In this economy, the entrepreneur allocates total working time h and LOBBY time 
ρ to maximize utility, subject to institutional constraint condition (1). That is, 
maxh,ρU(αx(h,ρ)+W,T-h)      .                                                                          (2) 
 s.t. x(h,ρ)=(1- (1-ρ) φ)ξ(h-ρ) 
Tradeoffs between managing the firm and addressing institutional constraints affect the 
way entrepreneur allocates total working time versus leisure and the amount of lobbying 
time ρ that the entrepreneur will spend protecting property rights. From equation (1), we 
have the marginal productivity of working hour h, 
xh=(1- (1-ρ) φ)ξ.                                                                                             (3) 
Marginal productivity of total working hours clearly decreases in φ, a measure of 
institutional cost. We also have the marginal productivity of LOBBY time ρ, 
xρ=(φ+hφ-2φρ-1)ξ.                                                                                        (4) 
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Substituting constraint condition (1) into the objective function, the FOC of program (2) 
with respect to h and ρ is αU₁xh=U₂=αU₁xρ. Thus, at optimum, 
U₂/U₁=αxh= αxρ                                                                                           (5) 
From (3), (4), and (5) we have  
(1- (1-ρ) φ) = (φ+hφ-2φρ-1).                                                                        (6) 
From Equation (6), we can obtain ∂ρ/∂φ>0, a comparative static result characterizing the 
equilibrium behavior of the entrepreneur. One of the major observable variables that 
measure violation of property rights is the arbitrary levy imposed by local governments on 
entrepreneurs. Empirically, we interpret φ as the levy. Thus, we have the following 
empirical predictions: 
Hypothesis 1. Everything else being equal, the heavier levy, φ, imposed on the 
entrepreneur, the more LOBBY time, ρ, (or less management time, h-ρ) spent by the 
entrepreneur.  
In addition to spending time in lobbying activities, political connections may also 
be important in providing protection to entrepreneurs by improving lobbying efficiency. In 
our highly stylized simple model, this is captured by political connections or lobbying 
efficiency, z, in the institution constraint as follows: 
x(h,ρ)=(1- (1-zρ) φ)ξ(h-ρ),                                                                         (7) 
where z>1 for politically connected entrepreneurs, z=1 otherwise. Thus, LOBBY time, ρ, 
increases in φ, but increases less for politically connected entrepreneurs than for others 
because they have higher productivity z in their LOBBY activities. 
Hypothesis 2. Everything else being equal, the heavier the levy, φ, the more LOBBY 
time, ρ, (or less management time, h-ρ) an entrepreneur will spend. Moreover, for 
politically connected entrepreneurs their ρ will increase less (or their management time, h-
ρ, will decrease less) than other entrepreneurs. 
4. Data and Variables 
Data used in this study are obtained from the Survey of China’s Private Enterprises. 
This survey was conducted in 2006 via stratified random sampling survey approach. To 
ensure representativeness of the data, the population of private firms was stratified by 
location, (i.e., provinces, cities/counties), stage of economic development, urban and rural 
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locations, and industry. The sample size of the survey is 3,837. The firms surveyed are 
located in 109 cities, or equivalent to roughly one-third of Chinese cities.  
Survey data were collected via face-to-face interviews. The survey provides a broad 
range of information on the governance of entrepreneurial firms and interactions among 
private business activities and institutions, such as local governments, local courts and 
regulations, and other factors. Entrepreneurs were asked to report the ways they allocate 
time; and other subjects e.g. finance, and governance of their firms, etc. The survey 
collected socio-demographic characteristics of the entrepreneur. 
The sampling survey scheme is carefully designed for representativeness. However, 
data collection is organized by or with the assistance of the government.22Thus, the sample 
may have potential bias that compared with the firms in the population, the sampled 
entrepreneurs may be closer to the government. Consequently, the actual problem in the 
population might be more severe than what we uncovered from the survey sample. 
Time allocation of entrepreneurs is the major type of variables in this study. The 
survey asked entrepreneurs for detailed information on the amount of time they devoted to 
different activities per day including work and leisure. When entrepreneurs are asked to 
report their normal working hours, they are asked to specify the time they devote to 
management activities, networking activities,23  and learning per day. That is, the total 
working time consists of three components. We sum up these three components and build 
up a variable for total working hours. “Work_time” is the total number of hours the 
entrepreneur devotes to management, networking, and learning activities per day, which 
distinguishes the time allocation of the entrepreneur between work and leisure. Our major 
interest is the ratio of time spent in lobbying activities over total working time, “Lobby_Rt”; 
and the ratio of time allotted to management activities over total working time, “Mng_Rt”. 
Table 1 shows that the sampled entrepreneurs work for 12.48 hours per day on average. By 
average, respondents spend 3.26 hours, i.e. more than 26% of their working time, on 
                                                          
22The survey was designed by sociologists and organized by the United Front Work Department of the CPC Central 
Committee, the National Association of Industry and Commerce, the State Administration for Industry and Commerce, 
and the Private Economy Academy of China. 
23 As the survey was conducted by official agencies, the term “networking” is used. However, most ’networking’ in 
China’s context is about building connections with the government for lobbying purposes. 
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lobbying activities; 7.5 hours, i.e. about 60% of their working time, on management, and 
1.40 hours to study during their working hours. It is worth to note that, on average, the time 
allocated to lobbying and management activities accounts for over 86% of the total working 
hours of entrepreneurs suggesting that the increase in lobbying efforts must come at the 
expense of the management efforts.   Therefore, in many cases, we should expect “Mng_rt” 
and “Lobby_rt” to be mirror images. In terms of institutional impediments, we focus on 
the violation of property rights. As mentioned in previous sections, local governments 
impose various levies on entrepreneurs. In the survey, entrepreneurs were asked to report 
the total amount of all the levies paid to the government beyond tax in the previous year. 
We use this information to construct our measurement for property rights violation. We 
first calculate the ratio of fees over sales for each firm (Forced_Fee). Based on the ratio, 
we construct the variable “High_fee,” a dummy variable that is equal to one if the firm is 
in the highest 25th percentile of “Forced_fee,” and zero otherwise. Table 1 shows that on 
average, firms pay 0.6% of the total sales to local governments as additional fees. However, 
this ratio has a highly skewed distribution. Certain firms pay considerably more than others, 
such that the median is less than the average, the standard deviation is larger than the mean, 
and the maximum “Forced_fee” is 11.5%.  
To prevent our estimations being driven by omitted variables, we control for 
entrepreneur and firm characteristics, as well as for region and industry effect. Detailed 
definitions of the variables are in Table A-1. Variables related to entrepreneurial 
characteristics include age (CEO_age), gender (CEO_gender), education (CEO_Edu), and 
disposable income (CEO_income) of the entrepreneur gained from the firm. Table 1 shows 
that on average, 68% share of the assets of the firm are owned by entrepreneurs. The 
average income of the entrepreneur, including salaries and dividends gained in the previous 
year is about CNY 240,000 (with a large standard deviation of CNY 414,390). Moreover, 
the average age of the entrepreneur is 44 years, and 85.9% have high school or higher 
education. Regional effects is measured by a dummy variable that equals to one if a given 
province was defined as a developed region by the National Statistics Bureau in 2006 and 
zero if otherwise to control the economic development of the province.  
Variables related to firm characteristics include size (Firm_size) and age (Firm_age) 
of the firm, and if the firm was privatized from a former SOE (Privatization). Table 1 
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shows that the average firm age is 7 years and the average firm size is 52 employees. 
Approximately, 20% of the firms in the sample are privatized.  
We are also interested to see how political connections affect lobbying efficiency 
(Hypothesis 2), i.e. how the connections moderate the sensitivity of the lobbying efforts to 
property rights violation. We measure entrepreneurs’ political connections by their party 
membership with a dummy variable “CPC” that it is equal to one if the entrepreneur is a 
CPC member at the time of the survey, and zero otherwise. Approximately 41% firms in 
our sample are owned by CPC members. Moreover, nearly 80% of these CPC member 
entrepreneurs are veteran party members, who joined the party and cultivated political 
connections with the government long before establishing a private business. 
Table 2 presents the comparison on all the variables of our interests for the group 
of firms which are charged high fees and which are not imposed high fees, and the t-tests. 
By average, firms being charged “high fees” pay 2.3% of their total sales as levies while 
the ratio for the counterpart firms is 0.06%; and this difference is statistically significant. 
Moreover, these two groups are significantly different in other aspects. In particular, by 
average, entrepreneurs of firms which are imposed high fees allocate more time on working 
activities, and then spend higher proportion of their working time to lobbying activities and 
less proportion of working time to management activities than the others. Moreover, bigger 
firms and privatized former SOEs are less likely to be imposed for high fees than the others. 
Furthermore, entrepreneurs of the high-fee firms are more likely to be younger and less 
likely to be politically connected.  
 
5.Empirical Findings 
5.1 Property Rights Institution and Time Allocation  
To investigate the impact of property rights protection on time allocation of 
entrepreneurs systematically, we estimate the following equation:  
𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ_𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑖 + 𝑑𝑋𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,                                               (8) 
where, 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖 measures the proportion of time spent by entrepreneur i for various 
activities, including “Lobby_Rt,” lobbying time over total working time ratio; “Mng_Rt,” 
management time over total working time ratio; and “Work,” total working hours spent by 
the entrepreneur. “High_feei” is a dummy variable that is equal to one if the levy in the 
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previous year (i.e., 2005) over sales ratio for firm i is in the top 25th percentile and is equal 
to zero if otherwise. 𝑋𝑖  is a vector of control variables for firm i, and includes 
characteristics of both the entrepreneur and the firm.  
Table 3 presents our baseline regressions estimations. Column (1) reports the 
effects of charging “High_fee” to entrepreneurs on their choice of total working hours. No 
statistically significant relationship is observed between “High_fee” and total working 
hours. Hence, property rights protection may not affect the time allocation between work 
and leisure in general. However, Column (2) shows that “High_fee” is positively and 
significantly correlated with “Lobby_Rt.” On average, entrepreneurs who have to pay 
higher levies normally allocate about 1.9% (about 7% of the mean) more time to lobbying 
activities than those paying lower levies. Column (3) illustrates that “Mng_Rt” is 
negatively and significantly correlated with “High_fee,” indicating that higher levies 
significantly reduce the time allocated to managing business. On average, entrepreneurs 
who have to pay higher levies normally allot about 2.2% (about 4% of the mean) less time 
to management activities. These results indicate that everything else being equal, 
entrepreneurs facing more severe violation of property rights spend significantly more time 
on lobbying activities at the cost of management time. This result is consistent with the 
prediction of Hypothesis 1 of our model.  
To crosscheck the results of our estimations, we include the absolute number of 
lobbying and management time allotted by entrepreneurs as seen in Columns (4) and (5), 
respectively, of Table 3. “High_fee” is significantly and negatively associated with the 
number of hours allotted to management time, implying that entrepreneurs who need to 
pay higher levies normally reduce time for management activities. Moreover, although no 
statistically significant, “High_fee” and the number of hours paid to lobbying activities are 
positively correlated. 
Table 3 further reveals interesting findings on the relationship between time 
allocation and characteristics of firm and entrepreneur. First, in general, entrepreneurs 
receiving higher compensation spend less time on work but allot a larger part of their work 
time to lobbying activities than others. Second, we observe that entrepreneurs of larger-
sized firms allot more time to work than those of smaller firms in general, and, spend a 
higher proportion of work time to lobbying activities and lower proportion of work time to 
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management activities. A potential explanation for these findings is that entrepreneurs who 
have more wealth choose to allot more time to leisure than work. Given the weak property 
rights protection, the marginal benefits of lobbying efforts for those who have larger wealth 
and larger firms may be higher than for entrepreneurs with lesser wealth and smaller firms.  
Moreover, as minor points of this paper, we observe that older entrepreneurs tend 
to allot more time to work and allocate a higher ratio of their work time to management 
activities than younger entrepreneurs. This may reflect the change in the lifestyle of 
different generations in terms of work and leisure choice. Finally, although no statistically 
significant difference is reported between female and male entrepreneurs in terms of their 
allocation of time between work and leisure, we observe that female entrepreneurs 
allocated more time to management and less time to lobbying activities than male 
entrepreneurs.   
5.2 Identification Strategies 
In the previous subsection, we report that the violation of property rights is 
associated with an increase in lobbying time and decrease in management time. Yet, there 
are alternative competing interpretations to the observed correlation. Hence, we discuss 
identification strategies in this subsection, including concerns on issues such as reverse 
causality and omitted variables etc.  
First, in principle, we are not too concerned with reverse causality issues because 
of the nature of the survey data. All financial information including imposed fees reported 
in the survey is based on the information for the previous financial year, whereas time 
allocation information is based on the average in the recent few months. Hence, the gap in 
timing for the information of the two variables implies that the levies and fees imposed on 
the firms cannot be the results of time allocation.  
However, identification concerns related to the omitted variables may remain. 
Although we have controlled a set of variables to control characteristics of entrepreneurs 
and firms, and region and industry effects, certain unobservable factors that potentially 
affect time allocation may still be omitted. For instance, the family background or social 
values of the entrepreneur may be coincidentally correlated to additional levies imposed 
on the entrepreneurial firm. Thus, it is plausible that the significant relationship we 
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observed between the variable “High_fee” and time allocation might be driven by 
unobservable factors rather than property rights violation.   
To address the potential identification concerns, we use the 2-stage least squares 
(2SLS) estimation to identify the effects of violation of property rights. In particular, we 
use two IVs to identify whether the firm is more likely to be charged with high fees. By 
using two IVs, we can test the relevancies between the IVs and our major explanatory 
variable, and the exogeneity of the IVs from the error terms of our estimations affecting 
the dependent variables.  
Our first IV is the weights of provincial government policies on non-state sectors, 
measured by the frequency of the key word ‘‘Non-public sector development” appeared in 
articles written by Party Chiefs of provincial party committees in the past two years before 
the survey, denoted as is CVRG. The data is covered by the Database of Chinese 
Communist Party Construction Periodicals (Zhonggong Dangjian Qikan Shujuku), which 
is the largest database of digitized CPC periodicals. The database covers 215 major CPC 
periodicals starting from 1994. Most periodicals in the database are published by Party 
Committees at provincial and municipality levels. 24  The sub-national level Party 
periodicals are the major platform through which provincial and municipal Party 
Committees promote policies within their jurisdictions. This IV satisfies the two conditions 
of exogeneity and relevance. First, the frequency of the key words ‘‘Non-public sector 
development” used by the Party Chief implies the extent to which the provincial-level CPC 
Committee prioritizes and supports the development of private sector, which is usually the 
largest component in the officially so-called non-public sector. Thus, we expect that in 
provinces where provincial Party Chiefs place significant emphasis on the non-public 
sector, property rights are better protected in general and entrepreneurs are less likely be 
imposed high fees. However, the frequency of the phrase, ‘‘Non-public sector 
development,” used by the CPC chief of the province should not be related to error terms 
related to the time allocation of individual entrepreneurs. 
                                                          
24 It also covers several dozens of national-level CPC periodicals published by the CPC central agencies, such as 
Qiushi, Dangjian, and Hongqi. 
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The second IV is Anti-Corruption, which refers to the number of registered cases 
under the direct investigation of provincial procuratorates, divided by the provincial 
population (cases per 100,000 persons). We collect data for cases two years before the 
survey was conducted. Data are obtained from the Procuratorial Yearbook of China (2004 
and 2005). The number of corruption cases under provincial procuratorate’s investigation 
is a good indicator of the seriousness of a province in fighting corruption in the past two 
years before the survey. Assuming the indicator Anti-Corruption proxies for the provincial 
governments’ efforts of anti-corruption (Cole et al., 2009), we expect that provinces 
fighting against corruption more seriously protect property rights and entrepreneurs are 
less likely to be charged high fees. Yet, provincial-level efforts on anti-corruption should 
not be related to error terms that affect time allocation of the individual entrepreneurs.  
Table 4 reports the 2SLS regression results when “High_fee” is applied in the two 
IVs. Panel A of Table4 presents the results from first-stage estimations. It suggests that 
show that the two IVs are qualified instruments. First, both CVRG and Anti-Corruption are 
significantly and negatively correlated to the dummy variable “High_fee”, confirming the 
relevance of the two IVs we used. The results of the Sargan tests indicate that both IVs are 
exogenous from unobserved factors that may affect individual time allocation. The results 
of the second-stage estimation are presented in Panel B of Table 6. It shows that the 
instrumented “High_fee” is positively and significantly related to “Lobby_Rt,” and 
negatively and significantly related to “Mng_Rt.”  
Supported by the evidence presented in Tables 3 and 4, we claim that Hypothesis 1 
cannot be rejected.  That is, violation of property rights reduces entrepreneurs’ 
management time. Moreover, the weaker the property rights protection is, the more likely 
the entrepreneur devotes more time to lobbying activities at the cost of management efforts.   
5.3 Political Connections and Time Allocation  
Hypothesis 2 of our model predicts that politically connected entrepreneurs are more 
efficient than others in using their lobbying time. Thus, they save more of their time for 
management. Approximately 40% of the firms in our sample are owned by CPC members. 
Moreover, nearly 80% of these CPC member entrepreneurs are veteran party members, 
meaning they joined the party and cultivated political connections with the government 
long before starting a private business. Therefore, CPC membership is a good proxy for 
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political connection and exogenous to time allocation. This condition allows us to explore 
the effects of political connections on time allocation. For this purpose, we specify the 
regression models as Equation (9): 
 
𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ_𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑖 + 𝜃𝐶𝑃𝐶𝑖 + 𝜇𝐶𝑃𝐶𝑖 ∗ 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ_𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑖 + 𝑑𝑋𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,                  (9) 
where 𝐶𝑃𝐶𝑖  is the measurement of political connection, that is, CPC membership of 
entrepreneur i. Our major interest is the interaction term between “CPC” and “High_fee,” 
that is, “CPC*High_fee.” 
Table 5 presents the estimation results, which indicate the absence of a statistically 
significant relationship between “CPC” and any time allocation variables. Yet, the 
interaction term “CPC*High_fee” is significantly and negatively correlated to “Lobby_Rt,” 
and significantly and positively correlated to “Mng_Rt.” These results suggest that 
everything else being equal, politically connected entrepreneurs spend relatively less time 
lobbying to deal with property rights violation than other entrepreneurs did. As a result, 
politically connected entrepreneurs save more time in management than others when others 
have to spend more time dealing with property rights violation. On average, politically 
connected entrepreneurs charged higher levies spend approximately 3% less of their 
lobbying time (about 11% of the mean) than others. At the same time, these entrepreneurs 
allocate 4.4% more of their management time (about 7.4% of the mean) at work than others. 
The estimation results shown in Table 5 are consistent with the prediction of Hypothesis 2. 
Thus, this result confirms that political connections may increase firm level efficiency for 
lobbying activities and reduce the marginal inputs of lobbying efforts when property rights 
are violated.  
5.4 Firm Characteristics, Property Rights, and Time Allocation  
In the following subsection, we further analyze how the age and size of firms affect 
entrepreneurs’ lobbying efficiency under weak property rights protection. First, 
entrepreneurs of older firms may have accumulated more connections with local 
governments than entrepreneurs of younger firms. These connections may also increase 
firm level lobbying efficiency for protecting each firm’s property rights. Therefore, we 
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expect that everything else being equal, entrepreneurs of older firms may spend less time 
in lobbying against property rights violation. Second, the size of the firm may matter. 
Under a regionally-decentralized authoritarian regime in China, competition between 
regional officials at the same level is an essential part of the cadre management system (Xu, 
2011). Larger firms may have higher value for local governments, which may help 
entrepreneurs to bargain with local governments when high levies are imposed. Economic 
growth and social stability are the most important performance assessment criteria for local 
government officers in the economic reform era. When a region has higher economic 
growth and less social conflicts, the head of the region will enjoy greater power and have 
higher chances of being promoted (Xu, 2011). Larger firms that can contribute more to 
local GDP and provide more jobs to local communities are thus of higher value for local 
government officers. Therefore, the lobbying efficiency of large firm entrepreneurs may 
be higher than that of the others. 
The specification of the regression models is in the following.    
𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ_𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑖 + 𝜔𝐹𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖 + 𝜂𝐹𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖 ∗ 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ_𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑖 + 𝑑𝑋′𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,       
(10) 
 
where “𝐹𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖” refers to the characteristics of firm i, including firm age and firm size; 
“𝐹𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖 ∗ 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ_𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑖” is the interaction term between the characteristic of firm i and the 
levy imposed to firm i; and 𝑋′𝑖 is a vector of control variables. 
Table 6 reports the estimation results. Columns (1) to (3) present the effects of firm 
age and interaction term between firm age and “High_fee.” Columns (4) to (6) report the 
effects of firm size and its interaction term. Column (2) of Table 6 shows that the 
relationship between “High_fee” and “Lobby_Rt” remains positive and significant. The 
interaction term “High_fee*Firm_age” is negatively and significantly correlated with 
“Lobby_Rt,” whereas no statistically significant relationship is observed between 
“Firm_age” and “Lobby_Rt.” These results imply that among all the entrepreneurs, who 
are charged high levies, those with older firms spend smaller proportion of working time 
in lobbying than others did. Column (3) shows a significant reduction in “Mng_Rt” 
associated with “High_fee”; whereas “Firm_age” and “High_fee*Firm_age” have no 
significant impact on management time. The results of Columns (1) to (3) suggest that firm 
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age may affect the sensitivity of entrepreneurs’ lobbying efforts to property rights violation, 
because when firms grow older, entrepreneurs accumulate more connections with local 
governments, which complement their lobbying activities. However, firm age has no 
significant impact on the sensitivity of their management efforts to property rights violation. 
Exploring the features of firm sizes, Column (5) of Table 6 shows that both 
“High_fee” and “Firm_size” are positively and significantly correlated with “Lobby_Rt.” 
The relationship between “High_fee*Firm_size” and “Lobby_Rt” is negative and 
significant. As to the impact on management time, Column (6) shows both “High_fee” and 
“Firm_size” are negatively and significantly correlated with “Mng_Rt,” whereas 
“High_fee*Firm_size” is positively and significantly associated with “Mng_Rt.” These 
results reconfirm our earlier estimations that weaker property rights protection induces 
entrepreneurs to exert more efforts towards lobby activities and reduce the proportion of 
time allocated to management activities. The larger the firm, the more lobbying efforts are 
required because the stakes of protecting property rights are higher. However, when the 
firm is larger, the value of the firm to the local government may be higher. Consistent with 
our predictions, when high levies are imposed on a firm, firm size may moderate the 
relationship between the property rights violation and time allocation at work. That is, 
under weaker property rights protection, the higher the value of a firm is to local 
governments, the more likely the entrepreneur of the firm has more bargaining power with 
local governments. Hence, this condition increases lobbying efficiency, and the 
entrepreneur may reduce lobbying time and save more time to deal with daily management 
activities.  
6. Conclusion  
This study contributes to the literature by providing systematic micro-evidence on 
the effects of institutions on entrepreneurs’ time or effort allocation, particularly on the 
effects of the violation of property rights on entrepreneurs’ effort allocation.  To our 
knowledge, the empirical evidence we provided on the interactions between institutions 
and entrepreneur allocation of working effort is the first of its type in the literature. This 
study analytically extends Becker’s model (1965) by adding institutional constraints. This 
framework allows us to analyze a concrete mechanism, both theoretically and empirically, 
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on why the violation of property rights reduces firm efficiencies (e.g., North, 1981; 
Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005).  
Employing a nationwide random sampling survey of more than 3,000 entrepreneurs 
in over 100 cities, we find micro-evidence that when the government violates private 
property rights by imposing high arbitrary fees, entrepreneurs spend more time lobbying 
to the government for protection, substantially reducing their management time. Moreover, 
politically connected entrepreneurs are better protected than others, such that they spend 
less time to lobby and are able to focus more on management activities. Overall, we find 
that entrepreneurs have to exert extra efforts in dealing with institutional obstacles at the 
cost of their time and efforts to management activities. Although the findings of this study 
are based on contemporary Chinese data, our discovery is general. This study confirms 
Adam Smith’s famous proposition that weak property rights hinder entrepreneurship 
(Smith, 1776).  
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Table 1 Summary Statistics  
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Work_time 3413 12.484 2.614 6.000 18.000 
Lobby_hour 3570 3.258 1.825 0 10.000 
Mng_hour 3696 7.507 2.552 2.000 14.000 
Lobby_Rt 3412 0.264 0.135 0 0.667 
Mng_Rt 3412 0.596 0.152 0.200 0.909 
Study_Rt 3412 0.140 0.076 0 0.750 
Forced_fee/sales 1982 0.006 0.017 0 0.115 
High_fee 1982 0.250 0.433 0 1.000 
CPC 3446 0.405 0.491 0 1.000 
CEO_share 3242 67.996 26.943 0 100.000 
CEO_income(10000 RMB) 3404 23.976 41.439 1.000 300.000 
CEO_age 3808 44.381 8.150 26.000 65.000 
CEO_edu 3815 0.859 0.348 0 1.000 
Privatization 3600 0.203 0.402 0 1.000 
Firm_age 3690 7.052 4.443 1.000 20.000 
Firm_size(log of # of employees) 3572 3.854 1.550 0.693 7.824 
Anti-Corruption 3837 0.282 0.069 0.151 0.492 
CVRG 3772 59.453 30.921 2 132 
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Table2 Comparison between firms with and without high fee charged   
  
Firms without high fee charged Firms with high fee charged 
Difference between the two 
groups 
Variable Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max Difference t-statistics 
             
Lobby_hour 1432 3.261 1.865 0 10 500 3.352 1.806 0 10 -0.091 -0.949 
Mng_hour 1452 7.614 2.532 2 14 509 7.254 2.602 2 14 0.360 2.740*** 
Work_time 1396 12.612 2.570 6 18 481 12.343 2.640 6 18 0.269 1.968** 
Lobby_Rt 1395 0.261 0.135 0 0.667 481 0.274 0.134 0 0.667 -0.014 -1.952* 
Mng_Rt 1395 0.600 0.150 0.2 0.909 481 0.585 0.152 0.2 0.909 0.014 1.801* 
Study_Rt 1395 0.139 0.076 0 0.750 481 0.140 0.075 0 0.429 0.000 -0.065 
Forced_fee/sales 1467 0.001 0.001 0 0.004 515 0.023 0.028 0.004 0.115 -0.023 -30.783*** 
CPC 1368 0.426 0.495 0 1 460 0.378 0.485 0 1 0.048 1.805* 
CEO_share 1374 67.159 26.546 0 100 470 70.923 25.956 6 100 -3.765 -2.669*** 
CEO_income(10000 
RMB) 1384 25.681 44.791 1 300 499 26.359 45.039 1 300 -0.677 -0.289 
CEO_age 1461 45.125 7.844 26 65 513 43.934 8.188 26 65 1.191 2.924*** 
CEO_edu 1462 0.855 0.352 0 1 514 0.868 0.339 0 1 -0.013 -0.711 
Privatization 1405 0.232 0.422 0 1 476 0.145 0.352 0 1 0.087 4.046*** 
Firm_age 1432 7.214 4.310 1 20 498 6.964 4.543 1 20 0.251 1.102 
Firm_size(log of # of 
employees) 1441 4.108 1.569 0.693 7.824 505 3.496 1.326 0.693 7.313 0.612 7.844*** 
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Table 3 Property Rights Violation and Time Allocation 
  (1)  (2) (3) (5) (6) 
  Work_time  Lobby_Rt Mng_Rt Lobby_hour Mng_hour 
High_fee -0.173  0.019** -0.022** 0.186 -0.497*** 
 (0.169)  (0.009) (0.010) (0.121) (0.164) 
CEO_share 0.004  -8.48E-5 3.06E-4** 4.60E-4 0.005** 
 (0.003)  (1.42E-4) (1.56E-4) (0.002) (0.003) 
CEO_income -0.004** 
 3.08E-
4*** 
-4.19E-
4*** 
0.003** -0.008*** 
 (0.002)  (8.36E-5) (9.16E-5) (0.001) (0.002) 
CEO_age 0.016*  -0.001** 0.001** -0.008 0.027*** 
 (0.010)  (4.99E-4) (0.001) (0.007) (0.009) 
CEO_gender -0.276  -0.030*** 0.030** -0.448*** 0.212 
 (0.217)  (0.011) (0.012) (0.156) (0.212) 
Firm_age 0.026  3.37E-4 3.94E-4 0.012 0.018 
 (0.017)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.013) (0.017) 
CEO_edu 0.298  0.006 -0.015 0.038 0.052 
 (0.207)  (0.011) (0.012) (0.149) (0.201) 
Privatization 0.194  -0.007 3.33E-4 0.059 0.011 
 (0.183)  (0.010) (0.011) (0.133) (0.180) 
Firm_size 0.136**  0.007** -0.009*** 0.131*** -0.019 
 (0.056)  (0.003) (0.003) (0.041) (0.055) 
Constant 10.84***  0.303*** 0.545*** 3.305*** 5.853*** 
 (0.610)  (0.032) (0.035) (0.441) (0.600) 
Industry effect Y  Y Y Y Y 
Regional effect Y  Y Y Y Y 
N 1439  1439 1439 1473 1488 
pseudo R-sq 0.009  -0.057 -0.083 0.011 0.012 
P-value 0.001  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Standard errors in parentheses = "* p<0.105; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01"
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Table 4 Two-stage Estimations on Property Rights Violation and Time Allocation 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Panel A: First stage High_fee High_fee 
High_fe
e 
High_fee High_fee 
Anti-Corruption -2.161* -2.161* -2.161* -2.198* -2.269** 
 (1.158) (1.158) (1.158) (1.137) (1.122) 
CVRG -0.007** -0.007** -0.007** -0.006** -0.006** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
All control Vars Y Y Y Y Y 
P 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Anderson canon. corr. 
LM statistics 
0.063 0.063 0.063 0.065 0.049 
Sargan Statistics 0.014 0.190 0.276 0.108 0.428 
N 1430 1430 1430 1464 1479 
Panel B: Second stage Work_time Lobby_Rt Mng_Rt 
Lobby_hou
r 
Mng_hou
r 
High_fee 0.650 0.303* -0.348* 4.173* -4.186 
 (2.607) (0.182) (0.204) (2.559) (2.867) 
CEO_share 0.004 -2.58E-4 0.001** -0.002 0.008** 
 (0.003) (2.19E-4) 
(2.45E-
4) 
(0.003) (0.004) 
CEO_income -0.004* 1.71E-4 -2.63E-4 0.001 -0.005** 
 (0.002) (1.45E-4) 
(1.63E-
4) 
(0.002) (0.002) 
CEO_age 0.017* -0.001 0.001 -0.003 0.021* 
 (0.010) (0.001) (0.001) (0.010) (0.011) 
CEO_gender -0.215 -0.020 0.018 -0.312 0.083 
 (0.227) (0.020) (0.018) (0.220) (0.258) 
Firm_age 0.022 1.74E-5 0.001 0.004 0.024 
 (0.017) (0.001) (0.001) (0.017) (0.020) 
CEO_edu 0.310 0.004 -0.012 0.029 0.043 
 (0.205) (0.014) (0.016) (0.196) (0.228) 
Privatization 0.212 0.008 -0.016 0.247 -0.181 
 (0.222) (0.016) (0.017) (0.216) (0.261) 
Firm_size 0.173 0.020** -0.024** 0.306** -0.179 
 (0.135) (0.010) (0.011) (0.128) (0.145) 
Constant 10.44*** 0.175* 
0.691**
* 
1.598 7.487*** 
 (1.284) (0.090) (0.101) (1.219) (1.386) 
Industry effect Y Y Y Y Y 
Regional effect Y Y Y Y Y 
N 1430 1430 1430 1464 1479 
Prob > F 0.0017 0.0204 0.003 0.0692 0.001 
Standard errors in parentheses = "* p<0.105; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
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Table 5 Property Rights Violation, Political Connection and Time Allocation 
  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  
Work_tim
e 
 
Lobby_Rt Mng_Rt 
Lobby_hou
r 
Mng_hour 
High_fee -0.285  0.031*** -0.040*** 0.322** -0.848*** 
 (0.221)  (0.012) (0.013) (0.157) (0.214) 
CPC -0.169  0.001 -0.001 -0.020 -0.137 
 (0.177)  (0.009) (0.010) (0.127) (0.173) 
High_fee*CPC 0.220  -0.030* 0.044** -0.358 0.828** 
 (0.357)  (0.018) (0.020) (0.255) (0.345) 
CEO_share 0.004  -5.94E-5 2.67E-4* 0.001 0.005* 
 (0.003)  (1.47E-4) (1.60E-4) (0.002) (0.003) 
CEO_income -0.004** 
 2.92E-
4*** 
-4.14E-
4*** 
0.002** -0.007*** 
 (0.002)  (8.52E-5) (9.32E-5) (0.001) (0.002) 
CEO_age 0.017*  -0.001* 0.001** -0.007 0.027*** 
 (0.010)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.007) (0.010) 
CEO_gender -0.228  -0.031*** 0.033*** -0.432*** 0.290 
 (0.226)  (0.012) (0.013) (0.162) (0.219) 
Firm_age 0.025  0.001 -3.62E-4 0.022* 0.008 
 (0.018)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.013) (0.018) 
CEO_edu 0.350  0.014 -0.025** 0.145 -0.052 
 (0.219)  (0.011) (0.012) (0.156) (0.211) 
Privatization 0.251  -0.005 -0.001 0.096 0.046 
 (0.193)  (0.010) (0.011) (0.139) (0.189) 
Firm_size 0.133**  0.006* -0.007** 0.113*** -0.002 
 (0.058)  (0.003) (0.003) (0.042) (0.056) 
Constant 10.950***  0.298*** 0.550*** 3.265*** 5.992*** 
 (0.633)  (0.033) (0.036) (0.454) (0.617) 
Industry effect Y  Y Y Y Y 
Regional effect Y  Y Y Y Y 
N 1354  1354 1354 1386 1400 
pseudo R-sq 0.009  -0.063 -0.093 0.012 0.013 
P-value 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Standard errors in parentheses = "* p<0.105; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Table 6 Property Rights Violation, Firm Characteristics and Time Allocation  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Work_time Lobby_Rt Mng_Rt Work_time Lobby_Rt Mng_Rt 
High_fee -0.799** 0.049*** -0.043** -0.961** 0.063** -0.067** 
 (0.317) (0.017) (0.018) (0.478) (0.025) (0.028) 
High_fee*Firm_age 0.089** -0.004** 0.003    
 (0.038) (0.002) (0.002)    
High_fee* 
Firm_size  
   0.217* -0.012* 0.013* 
    (0.123) (0.006) (0.007) 
CEO_share 0.004 -8.74E-5 
3.08E-
4** 
0.004 -7.24E-5 2.92E-4* 
 (0.003) (1.41E-4) (1.55E-4) (0.003) (1.42E-4) (1.55E-4) 
CEO_income  -0.004** 
3.02E-
4*** 
-4.15E-
4*** 
-0.004** 3.10E-4*** 
-4.21E-
4*** 
 (0.002) (8.35E-5) (9.16E-5) (0.002) (8.35E-5) (9.14E-5) 
CEO_age 0.016* -0.001** 0.001** 0.017* -0.001** 0.001** 
 (0.010) (4.98E-4) (0.001) (0.010) (4.98E-4) (0.001) 
CEO_gender -0.262 -0.030*** 0.030** -0.278 -0.030*** 0.029** 
 (0.216) (0.011) (0.012) (0.217) (0.011) (0.012) 
Firm_age 0.005 0.001 -4.36E-4 0.025 3.81E-4 3.46E-4 
 (0.020) (0.001) (0.001) (0.017) (0.001) (0.001) 
CEO_edu 0.319 0.005 -0.014 0.314 0.005 -0.014 
 (0.207) (0.011) (0.012) (0.207) (0.011) (0.012) 
Privatization 0.197 -0.007 0.001 0.197 -0.007 0.001 
 (0.182) (0.010) (0.011) (0.183) (0.010) (0.011) 
Firm_size 0.137** 0.007** -0.009*** 0.095 0.009*** -0.012*** 
 (0.056) (0.003) (0.003) (0.061) (0.003) (0.003) 
Constant 10.960*** 0.297*** 0.550*** 10.970*** 0.295*** 0.553*** 
 (0.611) (0.032) (0.035) (0.614) (0.032) (0.035) 
Industry effect Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Regional effect Y Y Y Y Y Y 
N 1439 1439 1439 1439 1439 1439 
pseudo R-sq 0.010 -0.060 -0.085 0.009 -0.060 -0.086 
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Standard errors in parentheses = "* p<0.105; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Table A-1 Variable definitions  
Variables Definitions  
Time 
allocation of 
the 
entrepreneur 
Work_time The average working hours per day in the recent months 
reported by the entrepreneur including learning time, lobbying 
time and management time  
Lobby_hour The average time paid by the entrepreneur to deal with 
networking activities in the recent months reported by the 
entrepreneur  
Mng_hour The average time paid by the entrepreneur to deal with 
management and other administrative activities of the firm in 
the recent months reported by the entrepreneur 
Study_hour The average time paid by the entrepreneur to learning in the 
recent months reported by the entrepreneur 
Lobby_Rt Lobby_hour/Work_time  
Mng_Rt Mng_hour/Work_time  
Property rights 
violation  
Forced_fee  Total additional levies imposed to the firm in the previous 
financial year  
High_fee  A dummy variable that equals to one if the ratio of the 
Forced_fee over total sales of the previous year is among the 
top 25 percentile and zero if otherwise  
Political 
Connections 
of the 
entrepreneur  
CPC A dummy variable that equals to one if the entrepreneur was a 
China’s Communist Party member at the time of the survey and 
zero if otherwise 
Entrepreneur 
characteristics  
CEO_share The ownership held by the entrepreneur over total equity of the 
firm in the previous financial year  
CEO_age The age of the entrepreneur in year at the time of the survey  
CEO_edu A dummy variable that equals to one if the entrepreneur has 
high school education or above at the time of the survey and 
zero if otherwise  
CEO_gender  A dummy variable if the entrepreneur is a female and zero if 
otherwise 
CEO_income  The total income the entrepreneur gained from the firm in the 
previous financial year  
Firm 
characteristics  
Firm_age  The age of the firm in year at the time of the survey  
 Firm_size  The total number of employees of the firm in logarithm form  
Privatization  A dummy variable if the private firm was privatized from a 
former state-owned enterprise and zero if otherwise  
Instrumental 
variables  
Anti-
Corruption 
The number of registered cases under the direct investigation of 
people’s procuratorates divided by provincial population (cases 
per 10,000 persons) in the past two years before the survey  
CVRG the frequency of the appearance of the key word ‘‘Non-public 
sector development” in articles covered by the Database of 
Chinese Communist Party Construction Periodicals written by 
the Party Chief of a specified province in the past two years 
before the survey. 
 
